mirror of
https://github.com/coolsnowwolf/lede.git
synced 2025-04-15 18:03:30 +00:00

Sync jitterentropy source code with linux-6.12 to solve the issue of jitterentropy initialization failed: [ 9.523489] jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: 9 [ 9.661916] kmodloader: 1 module could not be probed [ 9.662377] kmodloader: - jitterentropy_rng - 0 In linux upstream commit cf27d9475f37 ("crypto: jitter - use permanent health test storage"), when FIPS crypto is disabled, the health test results are always explicitly skipped. That means it will never return error code 9 (health test failed) again. Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/16684 Signed-off-by: Shiji Yang <yangshiji66@outlook.com> Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/18399 Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
446 lines
15 KiB
Diff
446 lines
15 KiB
Diff
From 04597c8dd6c4b55e946fec50dc3b14a5d9d54501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
|
||
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:48:11 +0200
|
||
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs
|
||
|
||
The oversampling rate (OSR) value specifies the heuristically implied
|
||
entropy in the recorded data - H_submitter = 1/osr. A different entropy
|
||
estimate implies a different APT/RCT cutoff value. This change adds
|
||
support for OSRs 1 through 15. This OSR can be selected by the caller
|
||
of the Jitter RNG.
|
||
|
||
For this patch, the caller still uses one hard-coded OSR. A subsequent
|
||
patch allows this value to be configured.
|
||
|
||
In addition, the power-up self test is adjusted as follows:
|
||
|
||
* It allows the caller to provide an oversampling rate that should be
|
||
tested with - commonly it should be the same as used for the actual
|
||
runtime operation. This makes the power-up testing therefore consistent
|
||
with the runtime operation.
|
||
|
||
* It calls now jent_measure_jitter (i.e. collects the full entropy
|
||
that can possibly be harvested by the Jitter RNG) instead of only
|
||
jent_condition_data (which only returns the entropy harvested from
|
||
the conditioning component). This should now alleviate reports where
|
||
the Jitter RNG initialization thinks there is too little entropy.
|
||
|
||
* The power-up test now solely relies on the (enhanced) APT and RCT
|
||
test that is used as a health test at runtime.
|
||
|
||
The code allowing the different OSRs as well as the power-up test
|
||
changes are present in the user space version of the Jitter RNG 3.4.1
|
||
and thus was already in production use for some time.
|
||
|
||
Reported-by "Ospan, Abylay" <aospan@amazon.com>
|
||
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
|
||
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||
---
|
||
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 4 +-
|
||
crypto/jitterentropy.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
|
||
crypto/jitterentropy.h | 3 +-
|
||
3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
|
||
|
||
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
|
||
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
|
||
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto
|
||
crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
|
||
rng->sdesc = sdesc;
|
||
|
||
- rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0, sdesc);
|
||
+ rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(0, 0, sdesc);
|
||
if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
|
||
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
||
goto err;
|
||
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
|
||
|
||
desc->tfm = tfm;
|
||
crypto_shash_init(desc);
|
||
- ret = jent_entropy_init(desc);
|
||
+ ret = jent_entropy_init(0, 0, desc);
|
||
shash_desc_zero(desc);
|
||
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
|
||
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
|
||
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ struct rand_data {
|
||
__u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
|
||
__u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
|
||
__s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
|
||
+
|
||
+ unsigned int flags; /* Flags used to initialize */
|
||
unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */
|
||
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
|
||
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
|
||
@@ -88,16 +90,9 @@ struct rand_data {
|
||
/* Repetition Count Test */
|
||
unsigned int rct_count; /* Number of stuck values */
|
||
|
||
- /* Intermittent health test failure threshold of 2^-30 */
|
||
- /* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 31. */
|
||
- /* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
|
||
-#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF (31 - 1) /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.1 */
|
||
-#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF 325 /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */
|
||
- /* Permanent health test failure threshold of 2^-60 */
|
||
- /* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 61. */
|
||
- /* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
|
||
-#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT (61 - 1)
|
||
-#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT 355
|
||
+ /* Adaptive Proportion Test cutoff values */
|
||
+ unsigned int apt_cutoff; /* Intermittent health test failure */
|
||
+ unsigned int apt_cutoff_permanent; /* Permanent health test failure */
|
||
#define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512 /* Data window size */
|
||
/* LSB of time stamp to process */
|
||
#define JENT_APT_LSB 16
|
||
@@ -122,6 +117,9 @@ struct rand_data {
|
||
* zero). */
|
||
#define JENT_ESTUCK 8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */
|
||
#define JENT_EHEALTH 9 /* Health test failed during initialization */
|
||
+#define JENT_ERCT 10 /* RCT failed during initialization */
|
||
+#define JENT_EHASH 11 /* Hash self test failed */
|
||
+#define JENT_EMEM 12 /* Can't allocate memory for initialization */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
|
||
@@ -148,6 +146,48 @@ struct rand_data {
|
||
***************************************************************************/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
+ * See the SP 800-90B comment #10b for the corrected cutoff for the SP 800-90B
|
||
+ * APT.
|
||
+ * http://www.untruth.org/~josh/sp80090b/UL%20SP800-90B-final%20comments%20v1.9%2020191212.pdf
|
||
+ * In in the syntax of R, this is C = 2 + qbinom(1 − 2^(−30), 511, 2^(-1/osr)).
|
||
+ * (The original formula wasn't correct because the first symbol must
|
||
+ * necessarily have been observed, so there is no chance of observing 0 of these
|
||
+ * symbols.)
|
||
+ *
|
||
+ * For the alpha < 2^-53, R cannot be used as it uses a float data type without
|
||
+ * arbitrary precision. A SageMath script is used to calculate those cutoff
|
||
+ * values.
|
||
+ *
|
||
+ * For any value above 14, this yields the maximal allowable value of 512
|
||
+ * (by FIPS 140-2 IG 7.19 Resolution # 16, we cannot choose a cutoff value that
|
||
+ * renders the test unable to fail).
|
||
+ */
|
||
+static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[15] = {
|
||
+ 325, 422, 459, 477, 488, 494, 499, 502,
|
||
+ 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512 };
|
||
+static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[15] = {
|
||
+ 355, 447, 479, 494, 502, 507, 510, 512,
|
||
+ 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512 };
|
||
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
|
||
+
|
||
+static void jent_apt_init(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int osr)
|
||
+{
|
||
+ /*
|
||
+ * Establish the apt_cutoff based on the presumed entropy rate of
|
||
+ * 1/osr.
|
||
+ */
|
||
+ if (osr >= ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup)) {
|
||
+ ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[
|
||
+ ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup) - 1];
|
||
+ ec->apt_cutoff_permanent = jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[
|
||
+ ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup) - 1];
|
||
+ } else {
|
||
+ ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[osr - 1];
|
||
+ ec->apt_cutoff_permanent =
|
||
+ jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[osr - 1];
|
||
+ }
|
||
+}
|
||
+/*
|
||
* Reset the APT counter
|
||
*
|
||
* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
|
||
@@ -187,12 +227,12 @@ static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_
|
||
/* APT health test failure detection */
|
||
static int jent_apt_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
|
||
{
|
||
- return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
+ return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int jent_apt_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
|
||
{
|
||
- return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
+ return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/***************************************************************************
|
||
@@ -275,15 +315,28 @@ static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
-/* RCT health test failure detection */
|
||
+/*
|
||
+ * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
|
||
+ * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
|
||
+ * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this is the minimum
|
||
+ * entropy required to provide full entropy.
|
||
+ * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr deltas for
|
||
+ * inserting them into the entropy pool which should then have (close to)
|
||
+ * DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the conditioned output.
|
||
+ *
|
||
+ * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo code of SP800-90B
|
||
+ * section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence we need to subtract one from the
|
||
+ * cutoff value as calculated following SP800-90B. Thus
|
||
+ * C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr or 60*osr.
|
||
+ */
|
||
static int jent_rct_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
|
||
{
|
||
- return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
+ return (ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
|
||
{
|
||
- return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
+ return (ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Report of health test failures */
|
||
@@ -448,7 +501,7 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d
|
||
*
|
||
* @return result of stuck test
|
||
*/
|
||
-static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
|
||
+static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 *ret_current_delta)
|
||
{
|
||
__u64 time = 0;
|
||
__u64 current_delta = 0;
|
||
@@ -472,6 +525,10 @@ static int jent_measure_jitter(struct ra
|
||
if (jent_condition_data(ec, current_delta, stuck))
|
||
stuck = 1;
|
||
|
||
+ /* return the raw entropy value */
|
||
+ if (ret_current_delta)
|
||
+ *ret_current_delta = current_delta;
|
||
+
|
||
return stuck;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@@ -489,11 +546,11 @@ static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand
|
||
safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;
|
||
|
||
/* priming of the ->prev_time value */
|
||
- jent_measure_jitter(ec);
|
||
+ jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL);
|
||
|
||
while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) {
|
||
/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
|
||
- if (jent_measure_jitter(ec))
|
||
+ if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL))
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
@@ -554,7 +611,8 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *
|
||
* Perform startup health tests and return permanent
|
||
* error if it fails.
|
||
*/
|
||
- if (jent_entropy_init(ec->hash_state))
|
||
+ if (jent_entropy_init(ec->osr, ec->flags,
|
||
+ ec->hash_state))
|
||
return -3;
|
||
|
||
return -2;
|
||
@@ -604,11 +662,15 @@ struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector
|
||
|
||
/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
|
||
if (osr == 0)
|
||
- osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
|
||
+ osr = 1; /* H_submitter = 1 / osr */
|
||
entropy_collector->osr = osr;
|
||
+ entropy_collector->flags = flags;
|
||
|
||
entropy_collector->hash_state = hash_state;
|
||
|
||
+ /* Initialize the APT */
|
||
+ jent_apt_init(entropy_collector, osr);
|
||
+
|
||
/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
|
||
jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
|
||
|
||
@@ -622,20 +684,14 @@ void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct
|
||
jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
-int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
|
||
+int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags, void *hash_state)
|
||
{
|
||
- int i;
|
||
- __u64 delta_sum = 0;
|
||
- __u64 old_delta = 0;
|
||
- unsigned int nonstuck = 0;
|
||
- int time_backwards = 0;
|
||
- int count_mod = 0;
|
||
- int count_stuck = 0;
|
||
- struct rand_data ec = { 0 };
|
||
-
|
||
- /* Required for RCT */
|
||
- ec.osr = 1;
|
||
- ec.hash_state = hash_state;
|
||
+ struct rand_data *ec;
|
||
+ int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0;
|
||
+
|
||
+ ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
|
||
+ if (!ec)
|
||
+ return JENT_EMEM;
|
||
|
||
/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
|
||
* that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
|
||
@@ -664,31 +720,28 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
|
||
#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
|
||
#define CLEARCACHE 100
|
||
for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
|
||
- __u64 time = 0;
|
||
- __u64 time2 = 0;
|
||
- __u64 delta = 0;
|
||
- unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
|
||
- int stuck;
|
||
+ __u64 start_time = 0, end_time = 0, delta = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
|
||
- jent_get_nstime(&time);
|
||
- ec.prev_time = time;
|
||
- jent_condition_data(&ec, time, 0);
|
||
- jent_get_nstime(&time2);
|
||
+ jent_measure_jitter(ec, &delta);
|
||
+ end_time = ec->prev_time;
|
||
+ start_time = ec->prev_time - delta;
|
||
|
||
/* test whether timer works */
|
||
- if (!time || !time2)
|
||
- return JENT_ENOTIME;
|
||
- delta = jent_delta(time, time2);
|
||
+ if (!start_time || !end_time) {
|
||
+ ret = JENT_ENOTIME;
|
||
+ goto out;
|
||
+ }
|
||
+
|
||
/*
|
||
* test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
|
||
* delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
|
||
* implies that we also have a high resolution timer
|
||
*/
|
||
- if (!delta)
|
||
- return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
|
||
-
|
||
- stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta);
|
||
+ if (!delta || (end_time == start_time)) {
|
||
+ ret = JENT_ECOARSETIME;
|
||
+ goto out;
|
||
+ }
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
|
||
@@ -700,49 +753,9 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
|
||
if (i < CLEARCACHE)
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
- if (stuck)
|
||
- count_stuck++;
|
||
- else {
|
||
- nonstuck++;
|
||
-
|
||
- /*
|
||
- * Ensure that the APT succeeded.
|
||
- *
|
||
- * With the check below that count_stuck must be less
|
||
- * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values
|
||
- * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at
|
||
- * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times.
|
||
- */
|
||
- if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) {
|
||
- jent_apt_reset(&ec,
|
||
- delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK);
|
||
- }
|
||
- }
|
||
-
|
||
- /* Validate health test result */
|
||
- if (jent_health_failure(&ec))
|
||
- return JENT_EHEALTH;
|
||
-
|
||
/* test whether we have an increasing timer */
|
||
- if (!(time2 > time))
|
||
+ if (!(end_time > start_time))
|
||
time_backwards++;
|
||
-
|
||
- /* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */
|
||
- lowdelta = time2 - time;
|
||
- if (!(lowdelta % 100))
|
||
- count_mod++;
|
||
-
|
||
- /*
|
||
- * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
|
||
- * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
|
||
- * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
|
||
- * the old_data value
|
||
- */
|
||
- if (delta > old_delta)
|
||
- delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
|
||
- else
|
||
- delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
|
||
- old_delta = delta;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
@@ -752,31 +765,23 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
|
||
* should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
|
||
* performed during our test run.
|
||
*/
|
||
- if (time_backwards > 3)
|
||
- return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
|
||
-
|
||
- /*
|
||
- * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
|
||
- * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
|
||
- * implied with 1 is preserved
|
||
- */
|
||
- if ((delta_sum) <= 1)
|
||
- return JENT_EVARVAR;
|
||
+ if (time_backwards > 3) {
|
||
+ ret = JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
|
||
+ goto out;
|
||
+ }
|
||
|
||
- /*
|
||
- * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
|
||
- * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments
|
||
- * in multiples of 100, but not always
|
||
- */
|
||
- if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
|
||
- return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
|
||
+ /* Did we encounter a health test failure? */
|
||
+ if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) {
|
||
+ ret = JENT_ERCT;
|
||
+ goto out;
|
||
+ }
|
||
+ if (jent_apt_failure(ec)) {
|
||
+ ret = JENT_EHEALTH;
|
||
+ goto out;
|
||
+ }
|
||
|
||
- /*
|
||
- * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
|
||
- * likely to not work well.
|
||
- */
|
||
- if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck)
|
||
- return JENT_ESTUCK;
|
||
+out:
|
||
+ jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
|
||
|
||
- return 0;
|
||
+ return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.h
|
||
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.h
|
||
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ extern int jent_hash_time(void *hash_sta
|
||
int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_state, char *dst, unsigned int dst_len);
|
||
|
||
struct rand_data;
|
||
-extern int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state);
|
||
+extern int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags,
|
||
+ void *hash_state);
|
||
extern int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
|
||
unsigned int len);
|
||
|