From the patch series description:
Several security issues in the 802.11 implementations were found by
Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi), who has published all
the details at
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2021.pdf
Specifically, the following CVEs were assigned:
* CVE-2020-24586 - Fragmentation cache not cleared on reconnection
* CVE-2020-24587 - Reassembling fragments encrypted under different
keys
* CVE-2020-24588 - Accepting non-SPP A-MSDU frames, which leads to
payload being parsed as an L2 frame under an
A-MSDU bit toggling attack
* CVE-2020-26139 - Forwarding EAPOL from unauthenticated sender
* CVE-2020-26140 - Accepting plaintext data frames in protected
networks
* CVE-2020-26141 - Not verifying TKIP MIC of fragmented frames
* CVE-2020-26142 - Processing fragmented frames as full frames
* CVE-2020-26143 - Accepting fragmented plaintext frames in
protected networks
* CVE-2020-26144 - Always accepting unencrypted A-MSDU frames that
start with RFC1042 header with EAPOL ethertype
* CVE-2020-26145 - Accepting plaintext broadcast fragments as full
frames
* CVE-2020-26146 - Reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive
packet numbers
* CVE-2020-26147 - Reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments
In general, the scope of these attacks is that they may allow an
attacker to
* inject L2 frames that they can more or less control (depending on the
vulnerability and attack method) into an otherwise protected network;
* exfiltrate (some) network data under certain conditions, this is
specific to the fragmentation issues.
A subset of these issues is known to apply to the Linux IEEE 802.11
implementation (mac80211). Where it is affected, the attached patches
fix the issues, even if not all of them reference the exact CVE IDs.
In addition, driver and/or firmware updates may be necessary, as well
as potentially more fixes to mac80211, depending on how drivers are
using it.
Specifically, for Intel devices, firmware needs to be updated to the
most recently released versions (which was done without any reference
to the security issues) to address some of the vulnerabilities.
To have a single set of patches, I'm also including patches for the
ath10k and ath11k drivers here.
We currently don't have information about how other drivers are, if
at all, affected.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Co-authored-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* mac80211: bump to 5.8-rc2
changelog:
dfe0bc8 mac80211: allow ACS restriction with fixed channel
727685c mac80211: rt2x00: define RF5592 in init_eeprom routine
cfd2f3b mac80211: create channel list for fixed channel operation
d1100c7 mac80211: Update to version 5.7.5-1
ed2015c mac80211: Update to version 5.8-rc2-1
a956c14 mac80211: util: don't warn on missing sband iftype data
8b3e170 hostapd: fix incorrect service name
68bf5a9 mac80211: don't kill wireless daemon on teardown
25e0ae6 mac80211: make cfg80211 testmode support optional (and disabled by default)
b7727a8 mac80211: fix AQL issues
3d731fc mac80211: merge performance improvement patches
* mt76: update to 2020-07-22
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* mac80211: allow VHT on 2.4GHz
Allow VHT rate on 2.4GHz in order to use 256-QAM
Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
* ath10k: allow VHT on 2.4GHz
Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
* hostapd: add vendor_vht option
hostapd has vendor_vht option to enable VHT (256-QAM) on 2.4GHz
Add this option to hostapd.sh so users can enable it via uci
Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
* ipq807x: Refresh kernel configuration
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* ipq807x: Add WCSS bus
This is needed to build ath11k.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* mac80211: Add ath11k
This adds the Qualcomm 802.11ax wireless chipset support.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Co-authored-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Co-authored-by: DENG Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
Co-authored-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
