From 71813b0d03e4d39da8fe25be7d4900b7218cb847 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shiji Yang <yangshiji66@outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2025 23:36:28 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] generic: crypto: fix jitterentropy initialization failed
issue
Sync jitterentropy source code with linux-6.12 to solve the
issue of jitterentropy initialization failed:
[ 9.523489] jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: 9
[ 9.661916] kmodloader: 1 module could not be probed
[ 9.662377] kmodloader: - jitterentropy_rng - 0
In linux upstream commit cf27d9475f37 ("crypto: jitter - use
permanent health test storage"), when FIPS crypto is disabled,
the health test results are always explicitly skipped. That means
it will never return error code 9 (health test failed) again.
Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/16684
Signed-off-by: Shiji Yang <yangshiji66@outlook.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/18399
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
---
...dd-RCTAPT-support-for-different-OSRs.patch | 445 ++++++++++++++++++
...r-Allow-configuration-of-memory-size.patch | 159 +++++++
...w-configuration-of-oversampling-rate.patch | 75 +++
...er-reuse-allocated-entropy-collector.patch | 117 +++++
...er-use-permanent-health-test-storage.patch | 242 ++++++++++
...-Hide-esoteric-Kconfig-options-under.patch | 80 ++++
...e-kvfree_sensitive-to-fix-Coccinelle.patch | 30 ++
...2-crypto-jitter-set-default-OSR-to-3.patch | 36 ++
8 files changed, 1184 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-01-v6.7-crypto-jitter-add-RCTAPT-support-for-different-OSRs.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-02-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-memory-size.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-03-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-oversampling-rate.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-04-v6.7-crypto-jitter-reuse-allocated-entropy-collector.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-05-v6.7-crypto-jitter-use-permanent-health-test-storage.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-06-v6.7-crypto-jitterentropy-Hide-esoteric-Kconfig-options-under.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-07-v6.10-crypto-jitter-Use-kvfree_sensitive-to-fix-Coccinelle.patch
create mode 100644 target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-08-v6.12-crypto-jitter-set-default-OSR-to-3.patch
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-01-v6.7-crypto-jitter-add-RCTAPT-support-for-different-OSRs.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-01-v6.7-crypto-jitter-add-RCTAPT-support-for-different-OSRs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d0ae1258f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-01-v6.7-crypto-jitter-add-RCTAPT-support-for-different-OSRs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
+From 04597c8dd6c4b55e946fec50dc3b14a5d9d54501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:48:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs
+
+The oversampling rate (OSR) value specifies the heuristically implied
+entropy in the recorded data - H_submitter = 1/osr. A different entropy
+estimate implies a different APT/RCT cutoff value. This change adds
+support for OSRs 1 through 15. This OSR can be selected by the caller
+of the Jitter RNG.
+
+For this patch, the caller still uses one hard-coded OSR. A subsequent
+patch allows this value to be configured.
+
+In addition, the power-up self test is adjusted as follows:
+
+* It allows the caller to provide an oversampling rate that should be
+tested with - commonly it should be the same as used for the actual
+runtime operation. This makes the power-up testing therefore consistent
+with the runtime operation.
+
+* It calls now jent_measure_jitter (i.e. collects the full entropy
+that can possibly be harvested by the Jitter RNG) instead of only
+jent_condition_data (which only returns the entropy harvested from
+the conditioning component). This should now alleviate reports where
+the Jitter RNG initialization thinks there is too little entropy.
+
+* The power-up test now solely relies on the (enhanced) APT and RCT
+test that is used as a health test at runtime.
+
+The code allowing the different OSRs as well as the power-up test
+changes are present in the user space version of the Jitter RNG 3.4.1
+and thus was already in production use for some time.
+
+Reported-by "Ospan, Abylay" <aospan@amazon.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 4 +-
+ crypto/jitterentropy.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ crypto/jitterentropy.h | 3 +-
+ 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto
+ crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
+ rng->sdesc = sdesc;
+
+- rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0, sdesc);
++ rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(0, 0, sdesc);
+ if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ crypto_shash_init(desc);
+- ret = jent_entropy_init(desc);
++ ret = jent_entropy_init(0, 0, desc);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ if (ret) {
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ struct rand_data {
+ __u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
+ __u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
+ __s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
++
++ unsigned int flags; /* Flags used to initialize */
+ unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */
+ #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
+ #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
+@@ -88,16 +90,9 @@ struct rand_data {
+ /* Repetition Count Test */
+ unsigned int rct_count; /* Number of stuck values */
+
+- /* Intermittent health test failure threshold of 2^-30 */
+- /* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 31. */
+- /* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
+-#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF (31 - 1) /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.1 */
+-#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF 325 /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */
+- /* Permanent health test failure threshold of 2^-60 */
+- /* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 61. */
+- /* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
+-#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT (61 - 1)
+-#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT 355
++ /* Adaptive Proportion Test cutoff values */
++ unsigned int apt_cutoff; /* Intermittent health test failure */
++ unsigned int apt_cutoff_permanent; /* Permanent health test failure */
+ #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512 /* Data window size */
+ /* LSB of time stamp to process */
+ #define JENT_APT_LSB 16
+@@ -122,6 +117,9 @@ struct rand_data {
+ * zero). */
+ #define JENT_ESTUCK 8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */
+ #define JENT_EHEALTH 9 /* Health test failed during initialization */
++#define JENT_ERCT 10 /* RCT failed during initialization */
++#define JENT_EHASH 11 /* Hash self test failed */
++#define JENT_EMEM 12 /* Can't allocate memory for initialization */
+
+ /*
+ * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
+@@ -148,6 +146,48 @@ struct rand_data {
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+ /*
++ * See the SP 800-90B comment #10b for the corrected cutoff for the SP 800-90B
++ * APT.
++ * http://www.untruth.org/~josh/sp80090b/UL%20SP800-90B-final%20comments%20v1.9%2020191212.pdf
++ * In in the syntax of R, this is C = 2 + qbinom(1 − 2^(−30), 511, 2^(-1/osr)).
++ * (The original formula wasn't correct because the first symbol must
++ * necessarily have been observed, so there is no chance of observing 0 of these
++ * symbols.)
++ *
++ * For the alpha < 2^-53, R cannot be used as it uses a float data type without
++ * arbitrary precision. A SageMath script is used to calculate those cutoff
++ * values.
++ *
++ * For any value above 14, this yields the maximal allowable value of 512
++ * (by FIPS 140-2 IG 7.19 Resolution # 16, we cannot choose a cutoff value that
++ * renders the test unable to fail).
++ */
++static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[15] = {
++ 325, 422, 459, 477, 488, 494, 499, 502,
++ 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512 };
++static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[15] = {
++ 355, 447, 479, 494, 502, 507, 510, 512,
++ 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512 };
++#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
++
++static void jent_apt_init(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int osr)
++{
++ /*
++ * Establish the apt_cutoff based on the presumed entropy rate of
++ * 1/osr.
++ */
++ if (osr >= ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup)) {
++ ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[
++ ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup) - 1];
++ ec->apt_cutoff_permanent = jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[
++ ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup) - 1];
++ } else {
++ ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[osr - 1];
++ ec->apt_cutoff_permanent =
++ jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[osr - 1];
++ }
++}
++/*
+ * Reset the APT counter
+ *
+ * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
+@@ -187,12 +227,12 @@ static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_
+ /* APT health test failure detection */
+ static int jent_apt_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+ {
+- return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
++ return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ static int jent_apt_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+ {
+- return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
++ return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ /***************************************************************************
+@@ -275,15 +315,28 @@ static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-/* RCT health test failure detection */
++/*
++ * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
++ * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
++ * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this is the minimum
++ * entropy required to provide full entropy.
++ * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr deltas for
++ * inserting them into the entropy pool which should then have (close to)
++ * DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the conditioned output.
++ *
++ * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo code of SP800-90B
++ * section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence we need to subtract one from the
++ * cutoff value as calculated following SP800-90B. Thus
++ * C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr or 60*osr.
++ */
+ static int jent_rct_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+ {
+- return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
++ return (ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+ {
+- return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
++ return (ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Report of health test failures */
+@@ -448,7 +501,7 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d
+ *
+ * @return result of stuck test
+ */
+-static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
++static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 *ret_current_delta)
+ {
+ __u64 time = 0;
+ __u64 current_delta = 0;
+@@ -472,6 +525,10 @@ static int jent_measure_jitter(struct ra
+ if (jent_condition_data(ec, current_delta, stuck))
+ stuck = 1;
+
++ /* return the raw entropy value */
++ if (ret_current_delta)
++ *ret_current_delta = current_delta;
++
+ return stuck;
+ }
+
+@@ -489,11 +546,11 @@ static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand
+ safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;
+
+ /* priming of the ->prev_time value */
+- jent_measure_jitter(ec);
++ jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL);
+
+ while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) {
+ /* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
+- if (jent_measure_jitter(ec))
++ if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+@@ -554,7 +611,8 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *
+ * Perform startup health tests and return permanent
+ * error if it fails.
+ */
+- if (jent_entropy_init(ec->hash_state))
++ if (jent_entropy_init(ec->osr, ec->flags,
++ ec->hash_state))
+ return -3;
+
+ return -2;
+@@ -604,11 +662,15 @@ struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector
+
+ /* verify and set the oversampling rate */
+ if (osr == 0)
+- osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
++ osr = 1; /* H_submitter = 1 / osr */
+ entropy_collector->osr = osr;
++ entropy_collector->flags = flags;
+
+ entropy_collector->hash_state = hash_state;
+
++ /* Initialize the APT */
++ jent_apt_init(entropy_collector, osr);
++
+ /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
+ jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
+
+@@ -622,20 +684,14 @@ void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct
+ jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
+ }
+
+-int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
++int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags, void *hash_state)
+ {
+- int i;
+- __u64 delta_sum = 0;
+- __u64 old_delta = 0;
+- unsigned int nonstuck = 0;
+- int time_backwards = 0;
+- int count_mod = 0;
+- int count_stuck = 0;
+- struct rand_data ec = { 0 };
+-
+- /* Required for RCT */
+- ec.osr = 1;
+- ec.hash_state = hash_state;
++ struct rand_data *ec;
++ int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0;
++
++ ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
++ if (!ec)
++ return JENT_EMEM;
+
+ /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
+ * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
+@@ -664,31 +720,28 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
+ #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
+ #define CLEARCACHE 100
+ for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
+- __u64 time = 0;
+- __u64 time2 = 0;
+- __u64 delta = 0;
+- unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
+- int stuck;
++ __u64 start_time = 0, end_time = 0, delta = 0;
+
+ /* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
+- jent_get_nstime(&time);
+- ec.prev_time = time;
+- jent_condition_data(&ec, time, 0);
+- jent_get_nstime(&time2);
++ jent_measure_jitter(ec, &delta);
++ end_time = ec->prev_time;
++ start_time = ec->prev_time - delta;
+
+ /* test whether timer works */
+- if (!time || !time2)
+- return JENT_ENOTIME;
+- delta = jent_delta(time, time2);
++ if (!start_time || !end_time) {
++ ret = JENT_ENOTIME;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
+ * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
+ * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
+ */
+- if (!delta)
+- return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
+-
+- stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta);
++ if (!delta || (end_time == start_time)) {
++ ret = JENT_ECOARSETIME;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
+@@ -700,49 +753,9 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
+ if (i < CLEARCACHE)
+ continue;
+
+- if (stuck)
+- count_stuck++;
+- else {
+- nonstuck++;
+-
+- /*
+- * Ensure that the APT succeeded.
+- *
+- * With the check below that count_stuck must be less
+- * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values
+- * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at
+- * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times.
+- */
+- if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) {
+- jent_apt_reset(&ec,
+- delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK);
+- }
+- }
+-
+- /* Validate health test result */
+- if (jent_health_failure(&ec))
+- return JENT_EHEALTH;
+-
+ /* test whether we have an increasing timer */
+- if (!(time2 > time))
++ if (!(end_time > start_time))
+ time_backwards++;
+-
+- /* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */
+- lowdelta = time2 - time;
+- if (!(lowdelta % 100))
+- count_mod++;
+-
+- /*
+- * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
+- * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
+- * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
+- * the old_data value
+- */
+- if (delta > old_delta)
+- delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
+- else
+- delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
+- old_delta = delta;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -752,31 +765,23 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
+ * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
+ * performed during our test run.
+ */
+- if (time_backwards > 3)
+- return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
+-
+- /*
+- * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
+- * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
+- * implied with 1 is preserved
+- */
+- if ((delta_sum) <= 1)
+- return JENT_EVARVAR;
++ if (time_backwards > 3) {
++ ret = JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+- /*
+- * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
+- * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments
+- * in multiples of 100, but not always
+- */
+- if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
+- return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
++ /* Did we encounter a health test failure? */
++ if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) {
++ ret = JENT_ERCT;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (jent_apt_failure(ec)) {
++ ret = JENT_EHEALTH;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+- /*
+- * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
+- * likely to not work well.
+- */
+- if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck)
+- return JENT_ESTUCK;
++out:
++ jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
+
+- return 0;
++ return ret;
+ }
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.h
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.h
+@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ extern int jent_hash_time(void *hash_sta
+ int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_state, char *dst, unsigned int dst_len);
+
+ struct rand_data;
+-extern int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state);
++extern int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags,
++ void *hash_state);
+ extern int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int len);
+
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-02-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-memory-size.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-02-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-memory-size.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b13fc8670
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-02-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-memory-size.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From 59bcfd788552504606e3eb774ae68052379396b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:48:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - Allow configuration of memory size
+
+The memory size consumed by the Jitter RNG is one contributing factor in
+the amount of entropy that is gathered. As the amount of entropy
+directly correlates with the distance of the memory from the CPU, the
+caches that are possibly present on a given system have an impact on the
+collected entropy.
+
+Thus, the kernel compile time should offer a means to configure the
+amount of memory used by the Jitter RNG. Although this option could be
+turned into a runtime option (e.g. a kernel command line option), it
+should remain a compile time option as otherwise adminsitrators who may
+not have performed an entropy assessment may select a value that is
+inappropriate.
+
+The default value selected by the configuration is identical to the
+current Jitter RNG value. Thus, the patch should not lead to any change
+in the Jitter RNG behavior.
+
+To accommodate larger memory buffers, kvzalloc / kvfree is used.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/Kconfig | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 11 +++++++++
+ crypto/jitterentropy.c | 16 ++++++++------
+ crypto/jitterentropy.h | 2 ++
+ 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1297,6 +1297,49 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+
+ See https://www.chronox.de/jent/
+
++choice
++ prompt "CPU Jitter RNG Memory Size"
++ default CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_2
++ depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
++ help
++ The Jitter RNG measures the execution time of memory accesses.
++ Multiple consecutive memory accesses are performed. If the memory
++ size fits into a cache (e.g. L1), only the memory access timing
++ to that cache is measured. The closer the cache is to the CPU
++ the less variations are measured and thus the less entropy is
++ obtained. Thus, if the memory size fits into the L1 cache, the
++ obtained entropy is less than if the memory size fits within
++ L1 + L2, which in turn is less if the memory fits into
++ L1 + L2 + L3. Thus, by selecting a different memory size,
++ the entropy rate produced by the Jitter RNG can be modified.
++
++ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_2
++ bool "2048 Bytes (default)"
++
++ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_128
++ bool "128 kBytes"
++
++ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_1024
++ bool "1024 kBytes"
++
++ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_8192
++ bool "8192 kBytes"
++endchoice
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS
++ int
++ default 64 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_2
++ default 512 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_128
++ default 1024 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_1024
++ default 4096 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_8192
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE
++ int
++ default 32 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_2
++ default 256 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_128
++ default 1024 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_1024
++ default 2048 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_8192
++
+ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFACE
+ bool "CPU Jitter RNG Test Interface"
+ depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@
+ * Helper function
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
++void *jent_kvzalloc(unsigned int len)
++{
++ return kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
++}
++
++void jent_kvzfree(void *ptr, unsigned int len)
++{
++ memzero_explicit(ptr, len);
++ kvfree(ptr);
++}
++
+ void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
+ {
+ return kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
+@@ -75,10 +75,10 @@ struct rand_data {
+
+ unsigned int flags; /* Flags used to initialize */
+ unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */
+-#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
+-#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
+ #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
+-#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
++#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE \
++ (CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS * \
++ CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
+ unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of
+ * memblocks * memblocksize */
+ unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */
+@@ -650,13 +650,15 @@ struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector
+ /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
+ * access
+ */
+- entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
++ entropy_collector->mem = jent_kvzalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
+ if (!entropy_collector->mem) {
+ jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+- entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
+- entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
++ entropy_collector->memblocksize =
++ CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
++ entropy_collector->memblocks =
++ CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
+ entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
+ }
+
+@@ -679,7 +681,7 @@ struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector
+
+ void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
+ {
+- jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem);
++ jent_kvzfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
+ entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
+ jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
+ }
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.h
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.h
+@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
++extern void *jent_kvzalloc(unsigned int len);
++extern void jent_kvzfree(void *ptr, unsigned int len);
+ extern void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len);
+ extern void jent_zfree(void *ptr);
+ extern void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out);
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-03-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-oversampling-rate.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-03-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-oversampling-rate.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..856400fce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-03-v6.7-crypto-jitter-Allow-configuration-of-oversampling-rate.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 0baa8fab334a4d7017235b72fa8a547433572109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:48:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - Allow configuration of oversampling rate
+
+The oversampling rate used by the Jitter RNG allows the configuration of
+the heuristically implied entropy in one timing measurement. This
+entropy rate is (1 / OSR) bits of entropy per time stamp.
+
+Considering that the Jitter RNG now support APT/RCT health tests for
+different OSRs, allow this value to be configured at compile time to
+support systems with limited amount of entropy in their timer.
+
+The allowed range of OSR values complies with the APT/RCT cutoff health
+test values which range from 1 through 15.
+
+The default value of the OSR selection support is left at 1 which is the
+current default. Thus, the addition of the configuration support does
+not alter the default Jitter RNG behavior.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 6 ++++--
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1340,6 +1340,23 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCK
+ default 1024 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_1024
+ default 2048 if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_8192
+
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR
++ int "CPU Jitter RNG Oversampling Rate"
++ range 1 15
++ default 1
++ depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
++ help
++ The Jitter RNG allows the specification of an oversampling rate (OSR).
++ The Jitter RNG operation requires a fixed amount of timing
++ measurements to produce one output block of random numbers. The
++ OSR value is multiplied with the amount of timing measurements to
++ generate one output block. Thus, the timing measurement is oversampled
++ by the OSR factor. The oversampling allows the Jitter RNG to operate
++ on hardware whose timers deliver limited amount of entropy (e.g.
++ the timer is coarse) by setting the OSR to a higher value. The
++ trade-off, however, is that the Jitter RNG now requires more time
++ to generate random numbers.
++
+ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFACE
+ bool "CPU Jitter RNG Test Interface"
+ depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+@@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto
+ crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
+ rng->sdesc = sdesc;
+
+- rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(0, 0, sdesc);
++ rng->entropy_collector =
++ jent_entropy_collector_alloc(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0,
++ sdesc);
+ if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ crypto_shash_init(desc);
+- ret = jent_entropy_init(0, 0, desc);
++ ret = jent_entropy_init(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0, desc);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ if (ret) {
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-04-v6.7-crypto-jitter-reuse-allocated-entropy-collector.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-04-v6.7-crypto-jitter-reuse-allocated-entropy-collector.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d56f1f244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-04-v6.7-crypto-jitter-reuse-allocated-entropy-collector.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 8405ec8e3c02df8b3720874c3e2169fef4553868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2023 09:10:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - reuse allocated entropy collector
+
+In case a health test error occurs during runtime, the power-up health
+tests are rerun to verify that the noise source is still good and
+that the reported health test error was an outlier. For performing this
+power-up health test, the already existing entropy collector instance
+is used instead of allocating a new one. This change has the following
+implications:
+
+* The noise that is collected as part of the newly run health tests is
+ inserted into the entropy collector and thus stirs the existing
+ data present in there further. Thus, the entropy collected during
+ the health test is not wasted. This is also allowed by SP800-90B.
+
+* The power-on health test is not affected by the state of the entropy
+ collector, because it resets the APT / RCT state. The remainder of
+ the state is unrelated to the health test as it is only applied to
+ newly obtained time stamps.
+
+This change also fixes a bug report about an allocation while in an
+atomic lock (the lock is taken in jent_kcapi_random, jent_read_entropy
+is called and this can call jent_entropy_init).
+
+Fixes: 04597c8dd6c4 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs")
+Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 2 +-
+ crypto/jitterentropy.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ crypto/jitterentropy.h | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ crypto_shash_init(desc);
+- ret = jent_entropy_init(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0, desc);
++ ret = jent_entropy_init(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0, desc, NULL);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ if (ret) {
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
+@@ -611,8 +611,7 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *
+ * Perform startup health tests and return permanent
+ * error if it fails.
+ */
+- if (jent_entropy_init(ec->osr, ec->flags,
+- ec->hash_state))
++ if (jent_entropy_init(0, 0, NULL, ec))
+ return -3;
+
+ return -2;
+@@ -686,14 +685,30 @@ void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct
+ jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
+ }
+
+-int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags, void *hash_state)
++int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags, void *hash_state,
++ struct rand_data *p_ec)
+ {
+- struct rand_data *ec;
+- int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0;
++ /*
++ * If caller provides an allocated ec, reuse it which implies that the
++ * health test entropy data is used to further still the available
++ * entropy pool.
++ */
++ struct rand_data *ec = p_ec;
++ int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0, ec_free = 0;
+
+- ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
+- if (!ec)
+- return JENT_EMEM;
++ if (!ec) {
++ ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
++ if (!ec)
++ return JENT_EMEM;
++ ec_free = 1;
++ } else {
++ /* Reset the APT */
++ jent_apt_reset(ec, 0);
++ /* Ensure that a new APT base is obtained */
++ ec->apt_base_set = 0;
++ /* Reset the RCT */
++ ec->rct_count = 0;
++ }
+
+ /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
+ * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
+@@ -783,7 +798,8 @@ int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr,
+ }
+
+ out:
+- jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
++ if (ec_free)
++ jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.h
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.h
+@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_st
+
+ struct rand_data;
+ extern int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags,
+- void *hash_state);
++ void *hash_state, struct rand_data *p_ec);
+ extern int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int len);
+
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-05-v6.7-crypto-jitter-use-permanent-health-test-storage.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-05-v6.7-crypto-jitter-use-permanent-health-test-storage.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c5916972
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-05-v6.7-crypto-jitter-use-permanent-health-test-storage.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+From cf27d9475f37fb69b5bc293e6e6d6c1d03cf7cc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 09:40:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - use permanent health test storage
+
+The health test result in the current code is only given for the currently
+processed raw time stamp. This implies to react on the health test error,
+the result must be checked after each raw time stamp being processed. To
+avoid this constant checking requirement, any health test error is recorded
+and stored to be analyzed at a later time, if needed.
+
+This change ensures that the power-up test catches any health test error.
+Without that patch, the power-up health test result is not enforced.
+
+The introduced changes are already in use with the user space version of
+the Jitter RNG.
+
+Fixes: 04597c8dd6c4 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs")
+Reported-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/jitterentropy.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
+@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ struct rand_data {
+ unsigned int apt_observations; /* Number of collected observations */
+ unsigned int apt_count; /* APT counter */
+ unsigned int apt_base; /* APT base reference */
++ unsigned int health_failure; /* Record health failure */
++
+ unsigned int apt_base_set:1; /* APT base reference set? */
+ };
+
+@@ -121,6 +123,13 @@ struct rand_data {
+ #define JENT_EHASH 11 /* Hash self test failed */
+ #define JENT_EMEM 12 /* Can't allocate memory for initialization */
+
++#define JENT_RCT_FAILURE 1 /* Failure in RCT health test. */
++#define JENT_APT_FAILURE 2 /* Failure in APT health test. */
++#define JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT 16
++#define JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(x) (x << JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT)
++#define JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(JENT_RCT_FAILURE)
++#define JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(JENT_APT_FAILURE)
++
+ /*
+ * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
+ * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically
+@@ -215,26 +224,22 @@ static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_
+ return;
+ }
+
+- if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base)
++ if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) {
+ ec->apt_count++;
+
++ /* Note, ec->apt_count starts with one. */
++ if (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent)
++ ec->health_failure |= JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
++ else if (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff)
++ ec->health_failure |= JENT_APT_FAILURE;
++ }
++
+ ec->apt_observations++;
+
+ if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE)
+ jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked);
+ }
+
+-/* APT health test failure detection */
+-static int jent_apt_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent) ? 1 : 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int jent_apt_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff) ? 1 : 0;
+-}
+-
+ /***************************************************************************
+ * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test
+ *
+@@ -261,6 +266,30 @@ static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_
+ {
+ if (stuck) {
+ ec->rct_count++;
++
++ /*
++ * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
++ * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
++ * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this
++ * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy.
++ * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr
++ * deltas for inserting them into the entropy pool which should
++ * then have (close to) DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the
++ * conditioned output.
++ *
++ * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo
++ * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence
++ * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated
++ * following SP800-90B. Thus C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr
++ * or 60*osr.
++ */
++ if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) {
++ ec->rct_count = -1;
++ ec->health_failure |= JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
++ } else if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) {
++ ec->rct_count = -1;
++ ec->health_failure |= JENT_RCT_FAILURE;
++ }
+ } else {
+ /* Reset RCT */
+ ec->rct_count = 0;
+@@ -316,38 +345,24 @@ static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
+- * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
+- * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this is the minimum
+- * entropy required to provide full entropy.
+- * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr deltas for
+- * inserting them into the entropy pool which should then have (close to)
+- * DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the conditioned output.
++ * Report any health test failures
+ *
+- * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo code of SP800-90B
+- * section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence we need to subtract one from the
+- * cutoff value as calculated following SP800-90B. Thus
+- * C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr or 60*osr.
+- */
+-static int jent_rct_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return (ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return (ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
+-}
+-
+-/* Report of health test failures */
+-static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return jent_rct_failure(ec) | jent_apt_failure(ec);
+-}
++ * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
++ *
++ * @return a bitmask indicating which tests failed
++ * 0 No health test failure
++ * 1 RCT failure
++ * 2 APT failure
++ * 1<<JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT RCT permanent failure
++ * 2<<JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT APT permanent failure
++ */
++static unsigned int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
++{
++ /* Test is only enabled in FIPS mode */
++ if (!fips_enabled)
++ return 0;
+
+-static int jent_permanent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
+-{
+- return jent_rct_permanent_failure(ec) | jent_apt_permanent_failure(ec);
++ return ec->health_failure;
+ }
+
+ /***************************************************************************
+@@ -594,11 +609,12 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *
+ return -1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+- unsigned int tocopy;
++ unsigned int tocopy, health_test_result;
+
+ jent_gen_entropy(ec);
+
+- if (jent_permanent_health_failure(ec)) {
++ health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec);
++ if (health_test_result > JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT) {
+ /*
+ * At this point, the Jitter RNG instance is considered
+ * as a failed instance. There is no rerun of the
+@@ -606,13 +622,18 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *
+ * is assumed to not further use this instance.
+ */
+ return -3;
+- } else if (jent_health_failure(ec)) {
++ } else if (health_test_result) {
+ /*
+ * Perform startup health tests and return permanent
+ * error if it fails.
+ */
+- if (jent_entropy_init(0, 0, NULL, ec))
++ if (jent_entropy_init(0, 0, NULL, ec)) {
++ /* Mark the permanent error */
++ ec->health_failure &=
++ JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT |
++ JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
+ return -3;
++ }
+
+ return -2;
+ }
+@@ -695,6 +716,7 @@ int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr,
+ */
+ struct rand_data *ec = p_ec;
+ int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0, ec_free = 0;
++ unsigned int health_test_result;
+
+ if (!ec) {
+ ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
+@@ -708,6 +730,9 @@ int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr,
+ ec->apt_base_set = 0;
+ /* Reset the RCT */
+ ec->rct_count = 0;
++ /* Reset intermittent, leave permanent health test result */
++ ec->health_failure &= (~JENT_RCT_FAILURE);
++ ec->health_failure &= (~JENT_APT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
+@@ -788,12 +813,10 @@ int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr,
+ }
+
+ /* Did we encounter a health test failure? */
+- if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) {
+- ret = JENT_ERCT;
+- goto out;
+- }
+- if (jent_apt_failure(ec)) {
+- ret = JENT_EHEALTH;
++ health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec);
++ if (health_test_result) {
++ ret = (health_test_result & JENT_RCT_FAILURE) ? JENT_ERCT :
++ JENT_EHEALTH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-06-v6.7-crypto-jitterentropy-Hide-esoteric-Kconfig-options-under.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-06-v6.7-crypto-jitterentropy-Hide-esoteric-Kconfig-options-under.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2dc2a0116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-06-v6.7-crypto-jitterentropy-Hide-esoteric-Kconfig-options-under.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From e7ed6473c2c8c4e45dd861bfa06e96189b11d8db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 18:00:08 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitterentropy - Hide esoteric Kconfig options under
+ FIPS and EXPERT
+
+As JITTERENTROPY is selected by default if you enable the CRYPTO
+API, any Kconfig options added there will show up for every single
+user. Hide the esoteric options under EXPERT as well as FIPS so
+that only distro makers will see them.
+
+Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/Kconfig | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1297,10 +1297,12 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+
+ See https://www.chronox.de/jent/
+
++if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
++if CRYPTO_FIPS && EXPERT
++
+ choice
+ prompt "CPU Jitter RNG Memory Size"
+ default CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMSIZE_2
+- depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+ help
+ The Jitter RNG measures the execution time of memory accesses.
+ Multiple consecutive memory accesses are performed. If the memory
+@@ -1344,7 +1346,6 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR
+ int "CPU Jitter RNG Oversampling Rate"
+ range 1 15
+ default 1
+- depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+ help
+ The Jitter RNG allows the specification of an oversampling rate (OSR).
+ The Jitter RNG operation requires a fixed amount of timing
+@@ -1359,7 +1360,6 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR
+
+ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFACE
+ bool "CPU Jitter RNG Test Interface"
+- depends on CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+ help
+ The test interface allows a privileged process to capture
+ the raw unconditioned high resolution time stamp noise that
+@@ -1377,6 +1377,28 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFAC
+
+ If unsure, select N.
+
++endif # if CRYPTO_FIPS && EXPERT
++
++if !(CRYPTO_FIPS && EXPERT)
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS
++ int
++ default 64
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE
++ int
++ default 32
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR
++ int
++ default 1
++
++config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFACE
++ bool
++
++endif # if !(CRYPTO_FIPS && EXPERT)
++endif # if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
++
+ config CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR
+ tristate
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-07-v6.10-crypto-jitter-Use-kvfree_sensitive-to-fix-Coccinelle.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-07-v6.10-crypto-jitter-Use-kvfree_sensitive-to-fix-Coccinelle.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0bd15c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-07-v6.10-crypto-jitter-Use-kvfree_sensitive-to-fix-Coccinelle.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 6e61ee1ca551292d8714c35c92a019c41db79e4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 23:25:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - Use kvfree_sensitive() to fix Coccinelle
+ warning
+
+Replace memzero_explicit() and kvfree() with kvfree_sensitive() to fix
+the following Coccinelle/coccicheck warning reported by
+kfree_sensitive.cocci:
+
+ WARNING opportunity for kfree_sensitive/kvfree_sensitive
+
+Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
++++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@ void *jent_kvzalloc(unsigned int len)
+
+ void jent_kvzfree(void *ptr, unsigned int len)
+ {
+- memzero_explicit(ptr, len);
+- kvfree(ptr);
++ kvfree_sensitive(ptr, len);
+ }
+
+ void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-08-v6.12-crypto-jitter-set-default-OSR-to-3.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-08-v6.12-crypto-jitter-set-default-OSR-to-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ade8f1005
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-6.6/906-08-v6.12-crypto-jitter-set-default-OSR-to-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 95a798d20060d2b648dd604321e347c85edfd783 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 08:25:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: jitter - set default OSR to 3
+
+The user space Jitter RNG library uses the oversampling rate of 3 which
+implies that each time stamp is credited with 1/3 bit of entropy. To
+obtain 256 bits of entropy, 768 time stamps need to be sampled. The
+increase in OSR is applied based on a report where the Jitter RNG is
+used on a system exhibiting a challenging environment to collect
+entropy.
+
+This OSR default value is now applied to the Linux kernel version of
+the Jitter RNG as well.
+
+The increase in the OSR from 1 to 3 also implies that the Jitter RNG is
+now slower by default.
+
+Reported-by: Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+---
+ crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCK
+ config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR
+ int "CPU Jitter RNG Oversampling Rate"
+ range 1 15
+- default 1
++ default 3
+ help
+ The Jitter RNG allows the specification of an oversampling rate (OSR).
+ The Jitter RNG operation requires a fixed amount of timing